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Abstract 
The present article examines the character of the European Union (EU) as a polity by looking at the 
mechanisms it employs to ensure the coherence of its foreign policies. It first contrasts three ideal 
polity types. The methods selected to ensure coherence in foreign policy actions differ according to 
each of the three polity types. The article then explores how the EU ensures coherence through 
institutional reform, and subsequently looks in detail at two illustrative policy fields: aid sanctions 
and civilian crisis-management. The investigation concludes that the organisation of EU foreign 
policies combines elements from different polity types. 
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, STATES AND OTHER GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS HAVE PUT         
in place various mechanisms to ensure that their policies are coherent out of a conviction 
that this enhances the effectiveness of their output (Nathan and Oliver 1987, OECD 2003, 
Gebhard 2010). The foreign policy of the European Union (EU) constitutes a prime 
example: its structures and formulation of EU are exceptionally complex in comparison 
with those of states and purely intergovernmental organisations. Until the introduction of 
the Lisbon Treaty, EU foreign policy has been articulated at the three different levels: in the 
Community framework of the first pillar (EC), in the intergovernmental framework of the 
second pillar, and at the national level by the member states. With the Lisbon Treaty the 
pillar structure is formally eliminated, but competences of different actors and decision-
making still vary from one policy field to another. Hence, the occurrence of incoherence is 
more likely than in other international entities. Incoherence can arise from different 
sources: conflicts may erupt horizontally among EU institutions or pillars and vertically 
among member states (Nuttall 2005).  
The EU treaties provide an obligation for all actors at play to formulate a coherent foreign 
policy (Tietje 1997; Wessel 2000; Hillion 2008). Such obligation, included for the first time in 
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the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community during its first revision in 
1986, the Single European Act (SEA), predates the creation of the EU in 1993. How does the 
EU implement this principle of coherence in its foreign policy? And what does this reveal 
about the nature of the organisation? The present article outlines how the methods 
utilised for ensuring coherence in foreign policy vary in different types of polities and 
subsequently establishes which of these methods are selected by the EU. We consider 
different ‘ideal types’ of international polities: The main type of actor in international 
relations is the state, of which the EU already presents some features. In a state, coherence 
rests on hierarchical decision-making structures in foreign policy. A second ideal type, the 
intergovernmental organisation, achieves coherence through coordination among 
member states while each member retains veto power. Finally, if considered as a 
cosmopolitan polity, the EU would add a new layer of government functions to the 
member states without superseding them. Coherence would thus be achieved by deeply 
institutionalised mechanisms of coordination.  
The methods used by the EU to implement the principle of coherence are analysed at two 
different levels. On the one hand, the article analyses treaty reforms and on the other 
hand, it examines the organisation of specific policy fields altered as a result of the 
emergence of new external actions by the EU. Because scholarship has overwhelmingly 
focussed on institutional innovations introduced by the treaties, this article attempts to 
widen the scope of the investigation by looking at the “micro-level”. Namely, it explores 
tailor-made arrangements devised to address incoherence in policy fields where inter-
pillar collaboration is necessary. Arrangements governing these policy fields were not 
conceived in the treaty reform process, but resulted from agreements hammered out at a 
later stage, after the treaty had entered into force. While the exploration of the 
mechanisms devised in the aftermath of treaty reform remains neglected in the literature, 
it can increase our knowledge about how the EU ensures foreign policy coherence. To this 
end, the organisation of sanctions and civilian crisis-management operations are looked 
into as cases exemplifying inter-pillar collaboration and the difficulties it entails.  
The present article proceeds as follows: A first section presents three ideal type polities 
developed in the framework of the RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe) project 
by Eriksen and Fossum (2007). A second section examines the methods used by the EU to 
implement its aspiration to enhance the coherence of its foreign policy. A final section 
concludes by ascertaining what these three case studies – treaty reform and the policy 
fields of sanctions and civilian crisis management - reveal about the nature of the EU as a 
polity.    
The requirement of coherence 
Defined as the absence of contradiction between policies, coherence in external policy 
output is a concern to many actors in international relations, in particular to federal states 
(Nathan and Oliver 1987, Di Francesco 2001, Stengel and Weller 2010). The idea that states 
need to follow a unitary foreign policy, free of contradictions, is the objective pursued by 
the principle of coherence. In a state, the actor bearing responsibility for co-ordination 
remains the state executive. According to Böckenförde, the executive government branch 
is responsible for the organisation and co-ordination of a common outcome (1964:39; 
129). In the case of the EU, incoherent outcomes are particularly likely to arise due to its 
fragmented legal-institutional structures (Smith K 2003). In contrast to states, which rely on 
one single bureaucracy for foreign policy and mostly a unitary source of foreign policy 
authority –  the executive – , EU foreign policy has struggled with differences between the 
EU level and the member states as well as between the Community and the 
intergovernmental level. In the absence of a single executive, the EU received 
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coordinating powers in the course of the integration process in order to allow it to shape a 
common foreign policy.  
The EU must ensure coherence at different levels. In order to ensure vertical coherence, 
the foreign policies of the member states and the EU should be complementary (Hillion 
and Wessell 2008). The problem of vertical coherence is aptly described in the 
Commission’s Communication on “Europe in the world”: 
first and foremost, political agreement among Member States on the goals [is] to be 
achieved through the EU. This requires a strong partnership between the EU 
institutions and a clear focus on a limited number of strategic priorities where Europe 
can make the difference, rather than dispersing efforts across the board. This is the 
condition sine qua non [...] For the EU, there is the additional challenge in ensuring 
coherence between EU and national actions (European Commission 2006: 5-6).   
Under horizontal coherence, also called “cross- or inter-pillar” coherence, policies between 
different pillars have to be coordinated. Beyond inter-pillar co-ordination, intra-
institutional coordination concerns the coordination of policies within a specific 
institution, e.g. Commission policies across different Directorates General (Christiansen 
2001).  
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the legal basis for coherence in EU foreign 
policy. According to its old Article 3 TEU (pre-Lisbon), the Union shall ensure consistency of 
its external activity and especially the Commission and the Council “shall cooperate” to 
this end. The old Article 13 TEU (now Article 26 TEU post-Lisbon) states that the Council 
“ensure[s] the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union”. Coherence 
emerges thus as an obligation for all actors in European foreign policy to coordinate their 
policies to produce coherent outputs. A formal requirement is needed to hold together 
different policies whose formulation corresponds to different actors and institutions 
within the EU.  
The ideal-type polities and their methods to ensure coherence 
Which methods can we expect a hybrid, unique entity like the EU to use in order to ensure 
coherence in its foreign policy? To answer this question, three ideal types of polities are 
presented, along with their corresponding methods of accomplishing coherence in their 
foreign policy actions. The following section conceptualises what coherence-building 
mechanisms are expected to look like according to these three ideal types of polities. Each 
of these ideal types uses different methods to ensure coherence in its international 
relations. 
Ideal-type polities and coherence 
The three polities introduced below are “intergovernmental organisation”, “federal state”, 
and “regional cosmopolitan polity”. They are ideal-types in the sense that their ideal 
conceptions do not necessarily match the empirical reality (Eriksen and Fossum 2007; 
Sjursen 2007). Parts of their conceptions may differ from empirical reality.  
The nature of the EU’s overall institutional setting and the nature of the EU’s institutional 
setting in foreign policy in particular have been researched for some time. Focussing on 
grand-conceptions such as “federations” or “intergovernmental organisations”, studies 
have analysed the nature of the overall institutional setting and have identified the EU as 
“less than a federation, more than an intergovernmental organization” (Wallace 1983), “a 
supranational organization” (Bogdandy 1999), “a quasi-federation” (Weiler 2003) or 
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“condominio” (Schmitter 2005). Studies that have paid particular attention to the 
institutional foreign policy structures of the EU have mainly analysed executive politics 
across pillars, calling them “transgovernmental” politics (Majone 2005; Smith 2003; 
Vanhoonacker 2011), “administrative governance” (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006) and 
“cross-pillar-politics” (Stetter 2004). Often these findings have not been linked back to the 
question of which grand-conception the EU resembles (but see Allen 1998; Burgess 2000). 
The present article links three grand conceptions to the field of EU foreign policy. Grand-
conceptions can guide us to understand the nature of the EU in the context of ensuring 
coherence in foreign policy.  
Intergovernmental organisation 
In the first ideal-type, the EU is viewed as an intergovernmental organisation (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2007). Its purpose is to address problems that its member states cannot resolve 
acting independently. Institutions are established in which member states retain veto 
power, preserving the intergovernmental character of the EU (Hyde-Price 2005). With only 
limited tasks being delegated to the European level, the member states steer the Union 
through modes of hierarchy (as principals) and intergovernmentalism (by upholding 
power to veto or consent). This ideally constitutes a European order with foreign, security 
and defence policies, based on the voluntary coordination of member states under the 
roof of intergovernmental – thus consensual or unanimous – decision-making. The 
competence to act in foreign policy lies with the member states, but the coordination 
thereof can mutually be agreed upon. Under this scenario, member states prevent 
incoherence by means of coordination. Coherence is only achieved at a vertical level 
through coordination of member states in the intergovernmental institutions of the EU. 
Member states do not lose their right to conduct foreign policies. Horizontal coherence is 
provided by holding EU institutions accountable, subduing them to the 
intergovernmental framework.  
Federal state 
In the second conception, the EU is regarded as a multinational federal state. There is a 
single foreign, security and defence policy at the federal level. In the “federal state” model, 
the integration of foreign, security and defence policy is based on the pooling and 
centralising of foreign policy powers that previously have rested on the state level. In this 
federal model, the policy is made by a federal administration taking over central functions 
of the national executives and administrations. The pooling of authority is linked to a 
strong belief in institutions on the level of the integrating entity. Like in most federal 
states, the competence of foreign policy making rests with the EU on a federal level, 
without ruling out sublevel foreign policy making. In order to achieve vertical coherence, 
the sub-federal level has to comply with decisions made by the federal level in foreign 
policy. Horizontally, the European foreign policy administration has to ensure inter- and 
intra-institutional coherence amongst the different branches of government dealing with 
foreign relations. This is done by the federal government through its power of 
organisation (Böckenförde 1964): the head of the executive uses organisational planning 
and hierarchical directives to make his or her administration work coherently (Nathan and 
Oliver 1987; Stengel and Weller 2010). 
Regional cosmopolitan polity  
The third conception considers the EU as a regional cosmopolitan polity, in which 
government functions become separated from the state and embedded in global 
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governance. Here, the EU is a democratic non-state polity, with explicit government 
functions. In such an EU polity, the concept of government would rest on a cosmopolitan 
authority of procedures established for decision making and law making (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2007:29). The EU’s authority to act is based on the idea that the regional order 
looks after the implementation and protection of cosmopolitan norms and principles 
(such as universal human rights) which form the constitution of a transnational (global) 
society.  While concurrent powers of foreign policy action could rest on the EU level 
(Sjursen 2007), coherence in the vertical dimension would be ensured by member state 
compliance. As a regional polity, the EU is embedded in global governance structures. In 
that sense, the EU policies would not only have to be coherent between the member 
states and the EU, but also between the EU and centres of global governance, such as the 
United Nations. On the regional level, independent institutions on the European level 
direct the co-ordination of EU foreign policy. EU institutions have to provide close 
institutionalised co-ordination in order to fulfil their governmental tasks. 
In the reminder of this article, the attempts by the EU to give effect to the obligation of 
coherence are examined against the background of these ideal-types of foreign policy 
actors.  
The quest for coherence through treaty reform 
This section examines how institutional reform has addressed the question of coherence 
in EU foreign policy. Which methods were selected for achieving coherence, and to which 
ideal polity-types do these different methods correspond?  
Already the Single European Act (SEA) which formalised the European Political Co-
operation (EPC) contained an exhortation to ensure coherence between its outputs and 
the external relations of the Community: “external policies of the European Community 
and the policies agreed in the European Political Co-operation must be consistent” (SEA 
30(5)). This explicit linkage subjected both areas to the need for consistency, and entrusted 
both the Commission and the Presidency with the task of ensuring consistency (Krenzler 
and Schneider 1997:134). However, the inclusion of a general exhortation in the treaty was 
largely unaccompanied by supporting institutional arrangements. The defining moments 
for the configuration of coherence in EU foreign policy came with the treaty revisions of 
the nineties at Maastricht and Amsterdam. Improving the effectiveness of the EU’s external 
capabilities was a key motivation behind the signing of the TEU in 1991 (Smith ME 
2004:209). The central innovation introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht was the 
establishment of a single institutional framework through the creation of the European 
Union. In terms of foreign policy, this comprised the external relations of the first pillar, 
agreed under the Community method, and the intergovernmental pillars of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Until then, the ECP 
and the TREVI groups, the predecessors of the CFSP and JHA respectively, had remained 
fully separate from the Community framework, as they were not covered by the original 
treaty. The rationale for the creation of the single institutional framework was that 
coherence would be improved because all policy fields, while governed under different 
rules, would now share the same institutions. As part of the creation of the single 
institutional framework, the small secretariat that had supported the EPC was integrated 
into the Council Secretariat. However, the establishment of the single institutional 
framework did not in itself lead to improved coherence of EU external action: “by 
attempting to create a closer link between the EC and the EU’s other external capabilities, 
the drafters of the TEU unwittingly created tensions, inconsistencies, and gaps between 
the rules governing these domains at the organisational and even individual levels” (Smith 
ME 2004:209). This situation was exacerbated by two further provisions: Firstly, the 
exhortation to ensure coherence was now addressed to both the Council and the 
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Commission. Secondly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was precluded from exercising 
jurisdiction over the policies produced in the second and third pillars. The combination of 
entrusting both Council and Commission with the task of ensuring coherence and the lack 
of ECJ jurisdiction was unable to eliminate the “grey areas” where the competences of 
Council and Commission overlapped. In fact, many of the arrangements contributing to 
EU foreign policy coherence result from sharpening the delimitation of competences 
between the Community and the intergovernmental framework. Thus, the unfinished 
businesses of Maastricht had to be solved through arrangements which were put in place 
following a series of major inter-institutional conflicts which erupted following the entry 
into force of the TEU. While the most publicised example was the dispute over the 
financing of the CFSP due to the European Parliament’s activism on the matter, similar 
struggles characterised the few years following the entry into force of the TEU (Schmalz 
1997:22). The outcome of those disputes created many of the mechanisms which ensure 
coherence in EU foreign policy until today.  
Similarly, activism among EU actors advocating arrangements for improved coherence 
emerged with the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the run 
up to the Treaty of Nice. While a renewed attempt was made to strengthen provisions on 
coherence in the treaty, the need for consensus once again brought about mechanisms 
which were harshly criticised by EU actors and commentators alike. Resenting that the 
Nice Treaty provisions on enhanced co-operation set ESDP apart from the rest of the CFSP, 
Missiroli lamented that “unless a legally more constraining framework is established…the 
potential for occasional turf battles and ‘malign’ initiatives and interpretations is there to 
stay” (Missiroli 2001:10). Paradoxically, the adoption by the EU of a military operational role 
through the establishment of the ESDP exacerbated the need for improving coherence, 
while the sensitive nature of defence issues rendered consensus among member states 
more difficult. Another example is the creation of a High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, 
a role introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. While this post potentially constituted a key 
instrument for the improvement of vertical coherence, the HR was meant to represent the 
Union externally in subordination to the Presidency, which already had to share its 
external representation functions with the Commission in accordance with Article 18(3) of 
the Amsterdam Treaty. Such an arrangement complicated the question of external 
representation of the Union as it added to the multiplicity of actors involved rather than 
reducing it. Only with the progressive enhancement of the powers of the HR in 
subsequent treaty revisions is developed into a role contributing to the enhancement of 
coherence in the CFSP.  
Yet, beyond the defining years of the post-Maastricht, and to some extent the post-
Amsterdam and post-Nice periods, improved coherence in EU foreign policy resulted from 
the increasing delimitation of competences between the institutions and pillars. The EU 
has been ameliorating its coherence mechanisms gradually: “despite a number of internal 
and external obstacles, the EU continues to make gradual institutional breakthroughs in 
this area” (Smith ME 2004:209). The step-by-step, often conflict-ridden elimination of “grey 
areas” was made possible chiefly by two developments. Firstly, the ECJ became 
increasingly involved in adjudicating in inter-institutional disputes over competences with 
major implications for coherence. The role played by EC law in promoting coherence 
through the ever-sharper delimitation of competences has been central (Cremona 2008; 
2011). Secondly, the delineation of competences also resulted from the Commission’s tacit 
acceptance of the loss of a portion of its autonomy in matters where Community and CFSP 
competences overlapped: “when a policy action generates a conflict between CFSP and 
EC decision-making rules […], the procedures of the CFSP tend to dominate […] Some 
CFSP decisions even undermined EC’s own competencies, thus contaminating the EC with 
intergovernmentalism” (Smith ME 2004:215). This development was facilitated by the 
circumstance that the Council that is responsible for the CFSP, although both Council and 
   
The EU Polity and Foreign Policy Coherence
9 JCER 
 
 
Commission are entrusted with ensuring coherence. In this sense, the arrangements were 
aided by the Commission’s selective activism: “Given its institutionalised preoccupation 
with economic integration, the Commission still chooses its battles carefully and has not 
emerged as a major enforcer of compliance in external political affairs” (Smith ME 2004: 
219). 
Up until the Lisbon Treaty, endeavours to ensure coherence conducted by treaty reform 
have been regarded as largely insufficient (Smith ME 2001). The Lisbon Treaty displayed a 
clear focus on the organisation of foreign policy. Three main institutional innovations have 
been discussed so far in the context of coherence: the creation of the posts of High 
Representative of the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of President of the European 
Council and the establishment of the European External Action Service (Gaspers 2010). The 
newly-created post of HR of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy constitutes a genuinely 
“cross-pillar” double-hat: the new HR is simultaneously Vice-President of the Commission. 
It enjoys, in both capacities, a right of initiative in the CFSP. In its capacity as HR, it assumes 
the external representation functions that previously corresponded to the EU Presidency, 
in addition to chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. In its capacity as Commissioner, it takes 
on a coordinating function of Commissioners from the RELEX family, with the notable 
exception of the Trade Commissioner. The addition of the role of head of the EEAS and of 
chair of the Foreign Affairs Council has led some observers to describe this post as a “four-
hatted” rather than double-hatted. By contrast, the position of President of the European 
Council has been created from scratch and has taken over some of the roles that once 
belonged to the rotating presidency. The creation of this post accompanies the de jure 
elevation of the European Council’s status to a fully–fledged institution, which is now 
officially entitled to identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union across all 
intergovernmental and former Community aspects of foreign policy. Accordingly, the 
President of the European Council also represents the Union on issues concerning its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
The setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was foreseen as part of the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty itself failed to specify its modalities, 
leaving decisions on the configuration of the EEAS to a post-treaty agreement, clearly due 
to the delicate choices that it involved. The decision outlining the organisation of the EEAS 
was only taken in June 2010, after extensive consultation with the actors involved, 
especially the European Parliament. According to its foundational document, the EEAS is a 
“functionally autonomous body” separate from the Council Secretariat and the 
Commission, operating under the authority of the HR. It has a mandate to support the HR 
as well as the President of the European Council and an explicit duty to “ensure 
consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those 
areas and its other policies” (Council 2010: art.3). Its establishment underscores the 
importance of the follow-up phase of the Lisbon Treaty to ascertain its consequences: “the 
actual enforcement of the Lisbon provisions on ‘foreign policy’ […] may prove as crucial as 
the original drafting of the treaty text” (Missiroli 2010: 429). Cremona resents that 
according to the treaty arrangement, “not only will there be a number of different actors 
to co-ordinate, a number of different actors will have responsibility for that co-ordination” 
(Cremona 2008: 34). To an extent, double hatting is being (ab)used by the EU in the 
expectation that it will ensure co-ordination in the absence – or in lieu - of legal-
institutional reform. As has often been the case in the past, the overly ambitious “synergy” 
arrangements might eventually lead to an uncomfortable grey area.           
The first treaty changes at Maastricht and Amsterdam correspond to the 
intergovernmental polity type, while the more recent arrangements tend to incorporate 
some elements that transcend the traditional intergovernmental level and tend to 
approximate the state polity type. This is particularly visible in the figure of the HR, which 
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takes on a co-ordination role within the RELEX family (except for the trade Commissioner). 
Similarly, the EEAS has mitigated the multiplicity of actors representing the EU in third 
countries, integrating members of the Council Secretariat, Commission and the diplomatic 
services of the member states. On the other hand, distinctively intergovernmental 
elements are maintained, such as the figure of a President of the European Council.  
The quest for coherence in policy fields 
While scholarly attention has overwhelmingly focused on how institutional reform can 
enhance coherence, developments outside the treaty framework remain central. Indeed, 
post-treaty arrangements often served to resolve conflicts created by the often 
cumbersome provisions of the treaties.  
Sanctions  
The imposition of sanctions by the EU constitutes a classic case of inter-pillar collaboration 
– indeed, one that precedes the creation of the pillar structure (Nuttall 1996; Koutrakos 
2001). When EC member states were first confronted with the requirement to implement 
UNSC sanctions in the sixties, they did so through national legislation, relying on a Treaty 
provision expressly allowing member states to deviate from the Common Commercial 
Policy “in order to carry out obligations […] accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace 
and international security” (Article 297 TEC). Yet, the Commission argued in favour of 
uniform implementation though the Community claiming that different national 
measures threated to undermine the operation of the common market (Nuttall 1996:138). 
This prompted a shift towards the involvement of the Community, giving rise to the so-
called “two-steps” procedure (Lukaschek 2002): It consisted in the adoption of a decision 
to impose sanctions in the extra-communitarian forum of the European Political Co-
operation (ECP), followed by the adoption of a Community Regulation under Article 113 
TEC.  
The shift from implementing sanctions through national measures to Community 
legislation can be explained by pragmatic considerations: Member states aimed to 
enhance the effectiveness of sanctions by implementing them uniformly throughout the 
Community (Koutrakos 2001; Lukaschek 2002). The two-steps procedure provided a 
mechanism which could be employed for member states to agree and implement 
sanctions in the absence of a UNSC mandate. Indeed, this method was employed in the 
early 1980s when the EC member states imposed autonomous sanctions against the USSR 
during the Polish crisis and against Argentina during the Falklands war. The two steps 
procedure was eventually formalised by the Treaty of Maastricht (Koutrakos 2001). The 
codification of the inter-pillar procedure for the application of sanctions solved the legal 
problem created by the Community implementing decisions adopted in an extra-
communitarian framework, a situation previously judged incompatible with EC law. This 
procedure, a sui generis provision in Community Law, served as a model for subsequent 
“hybrid” legal bases such as the “dual-use regulations” (Gebhard 2010: 115). 
Sources of incoherence  
Despite the formalisation of the time-honoured two-steps procedure under the Maastricht 
Treaty, a number of inconsistencies in the implementation of sanctions can be identified.  
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Horizontal incoherence: hurdle surmounted 
In the post-Maastricht phase, inconsistencies were motivated by a situation of uncertainty 
regarding which pillar was appropriate for the suspension of development aid to third 
countries. Sanctions of different nature, such as arms embargoes, financial measures and 
interruption of aid were agreed simultaneously and reflected in a single document. Hence, 
following the entry into force of the TEU, sanctions belonging to different pillars were 
decided concurrently. Development aid to target countries was sometimes suspended 
according to first pillar procedures, and sometimes agreed in the framework of the second 
pillar despite being identical in character and scope: The Commission cut off aid to 
Rwanda following the Kibeho massacre in 1995, while the Council suspended aid to Niger 
in response to its 1996 coup d’état (Schmalz 1997:31). This led to considerable tensions as 
both Council and Commission claimed to have exclusive responsibility for the suspension 
of development aid.  
Competences were subsequently clarified. The accommodation reached consists in 
submitting measures within different fields of competence to separate procedures. Under 
the current arrangement, the Community has responsibility for development aid 
suspensions. This takes place in the framework of consultations which are led by the 
Commission, a responsibility allocated in recognition of its particular expertise in the field 
of development co-operation (Schmalz 1997:33). Yet, the Commission abandoned the 
practice of suspending aid without the approval of the Council, which became necessary 
for suspensions and resumptions of aid. In contrast, all other sanctions are agreed in the 
framework of the CFSP and applied through the two-steps procedure. For instance, 
development aid to Zimbabwe was interrupted in 2002 through a first-pillar decision, 
while on the same day a CFSP Common Position imposing a visa ban on the ruling elite 
was adopted.  
Vertical incoherence: persistent non-compliance  
A traditional problem of sanctions lies with the challenges posed by member states which 
do not comply with them. In comparison with other international sanctions, notably those 
imposed by the UN, non-compliance with EU measures is infrequent. Still, the rare 
deviations from CFSP sanctions have routinely been tolerated and ultimately legalised 
through the inclusion of clauses in the imposing documents allowing states to deviate 
from them under specific circumstances. This practice was initiated in order to 
accommodate Greece’s refusal to implement the grain embargo imposed against the 
Soviet Union in 1980 (de Wilde 1998), and has survived to our days. France’s decision to 
invite Zimbabwean President Mugabe to the French African summit in 2002 in defiance of 
the visa ban compelled the EU to insert a clause in ensuing regimes allowing states to 
grant exemptions. While not technically disallowed, these deviations contravene the spirit 
of the measures and undermine their credibility. Thus, the EU obviated the problem of 
vertical inconsistency by accommodating occasional non-compliance.   
Assessment: which polity? 
The operation of sanctions displays a relatively harmonious and well-developed method 
of ensuring coherence. The accommodation found successfully prevented the recurrence 
of horizontal inconsistencies, even though it does so, to some extent, to the detriment of 
Commission prerogatives. Nevertheless, the fact that CFSP sanctions mostly consist of 
targeted measures deprived of economic implications renders the possibility of market 
distortion more unlikely and consequently makes the participation of the Community less 
relevant. Yet, the elimination of inter-pillar tension in the field of sanctions has been 
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accompanied by the persistence of vertical inconsistencies. The fact that the individual 
behaviour of the member states is responsible for inconsistencies suggests that 
institutional provisions are more useful in disciplining the inter-pillar relationship than 
individual member states which deviate from agreed decisions.  
What do the methods employed by the EU to solve the problems of inconsistencies reveal 
with regard to our ideal polity types? To which ideal polity type do these methods 
correspond?  
The arrangements put in place in order to solve inconsistency problems display some 
features corresponding to each of the ideal types. The centre of gravity in the decision-
making process is still located in the second pillar, which points to the international 
organisation type, according to which coherence is ensured by following an 
intergovernmental decision-making model where each member state has a veto. 
Furthermore, many coherence problems faced by the EU typically correspond to those 
suffered by international organisations, such as member state defection. On the other 
hand, the EU comes close to the ideal regional cosmopolitan type embedded in global 
governance. In the field of sanctions, the EU closely approximates the cosmopolitan entity 
in which co-ordination with other international actors is ensured. Collaboration with the 
UN, but also with major international partners such as the US is central. Moreover, the EU 
and UN practice have remained intertwined over the years, with EU sanctions often 
overlapping with UN practice (Portela 2005; 2010). Also, the Commission collaborates 
closely with the Council, drafts sanctions legislation and monitors the implementation of 
financial and economic sanctions, while member states are in charge of implementing 
bans and embargoes of non-economic nature. Thus, these entities discharge government 
functions in different phases of the formulation and implementation of sanctions, forming 
a new layer of governance.  
Nevertheless, while the methods used to achieve coherence feature elements of these 
types, the EU functions mostly as a state in terms of sanctions imposition and 
implementation. The mechanisms for imposition and implementation of sanctions in the 
EU resemble the hierarchical allocation of responsibilities that characterise a federal entity 
(Coppieters 2007). The model of decision-making follows a hierarchical structure 
characterised by clearly defined competences of the actors involved. The legal acts are 
binding upon member states, and even impose reporting requirements on public and 
private financial institutions. The resemblance to the hierarchical division of labour that 
characterises states is especially evident in the solution selected to address the problem of 
horizontal coherence: The initial conflict between the Council and Commission was solved 
by (re)allocating competences among EU institutions, whereby the Council was entrusted 
with CFSP sanctions while the Commission retained some responsibility for aid 
suspensions. Beyond the thematic division of labour, roles were also allocated along 
functional lines: through the two-steps procedure, the Council remained the decision-
making centre for the imposition and lifting of sanctions; yet, the specificities of the 
sanctions regime such as the items covered under the embargo are worked out in the 
form of a Regulation with considerable Commission’s input. Thus, the use of 
hierarchisation and functional division of labour suggests that the EU neutralised a 
potential source of incoherence by using methods characteristic of a state. 
Civilian crisis-management 
A new dimension of EU external relations, crisis-management has both a civilian and a 
military realm. Civilian crisis-management embraces crisis-management tools “in the 
absence of military means”, such as the deployment of police, administrative and judicial 
staff (Howorth 2007:124). Military crisis-management has been conducted in the 
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framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and after Lisbon in the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), whereas up to the Lisbon Treaty 
competences for civilian crisis-management have been found in the first and second pillar 
of the EU. In the first pillar, civilian crisis management instruments have comprised a wide 
range of tools, including those from humanitarian aid, development and human rights 
policies: the Humanitarian Aid Instrument, the Instrument for Stability, the Democratic and 
Human Rights Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and the 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Agreement (European Commission 2006:4). In the 
second pillar of the EU, the most important instruments of civilian crisis-management have 
been laid down in the Petersberg tasks in the framework of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) – now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). According to 
the Feira Council in 2000, civilian missions encompass policing missions, rule of law 
missions, civilian administration missions and civil protection. At the time of writing, ten 
civilian crisis-management missions are run by the EU, seven have been completed.1 After 
Lisbon, the policies originally assigned to different pillars continue to vary according to 
different decision-making processes and the competence of different actors in the field.  
Sources of incoherence 
With the introduction of ESDP, the TEU created a potential for duplication: civilian crisis-
management could now be decided upon in two ways: through the Community and 
intergovernmentally (Nowak 2006: 141). Hoffmeister, who was at the time lawyer at the 
Commission legal service, has argued that civilian crisis-management is often, when it 
comes to short-term civilian crisis-responses, in a “grey zone” (2008:163). At the same time, 
the treaties require a solidly justified power for action, as they do not allow encroachments 
upon the two mechanisms. The old Art. 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) prohibited encroachments 
upon Community law by EU acts: If external action rested on a Community competence, it 
could not be enacted through intergovernmental means (Hoffmeister 2008:159). The new 
Art. 40 TEU (post-Lisbon) foresees that encroachments are also not possible on powers of 
the Union in CFSP/CSDP. The two areas of competences are thus demarcated by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, while factually civilian crisis-management remains a domain of “cross-
pillar-politics” (Stetter 2004). But in the end how does the EU ensure coherent civilian 
crisis-management? 
Horizontal coherence  
In the old pillar-structure, the Community has had the competence to act in a number of 
fields concerned with development and conflict prevention (Hoffmeister 2008:163). The 
Community received the competence of election monitoring missions in 1999 through 
two new Regulations (975/99 and 976/99) which provided a specific legal basis for 
Community operations that “contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” in third countries (European Commission 2000:11). However, for 
some missions in the field of rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection and 
monitoring, the intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP framework was chosen even though, as 
critics argued, these fields belonged to Community competences (Hoffmeister 2008:164-
170). The dominance of CFSP/CSDP in civilian crisis-management provoked concerns in 
the Commission that external relations were being transferred to the intergovernmental 
CFSP/CSDP framework. The Commission filed a case against the Council in front of the ECJ 
arguing that the Council had impinged upon Community competence by adopting a CFSP 
Joint Action to combat small arms proliferation in West Africa. The ECJ ruled that the 
                                                
1 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=268&amp;lang=EN (accessed 10 May 2011). 
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measures of the CFSP Joint Action should have been adopted in two acts – one of them 
intergovernmental, containing the security aspects, and a second one, a Community act, 
encompassing the development aspects of the action (Wessel 2009:136; De Baere 
2009:288). The Court departed from the reasoning of its Advocate General in the first 
ruling, who argued that the CFSP Joint Action was justifiable as an intergovernmental 
measure on account of its clear “security nature” (Wessel 2009:136). The Court annulled the 
original Council decision, which “means that no second or third pillar act may be adopted 
on any matter falling within the scope of the EC Treaty, regardless of the non-exclusive 
character of the Community competence concerned” (De Baere 2009:289). The jurisdiction 
of the ECJ in ECOWAS has put a break on a more integrated civilian crisis-management 
approach: neither the Community, nor CFSP/CSDP can take over full responsibility.  
Coordination of civilian crisis-management rests on a complex network of bodies. The 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), in which member states, Commission and the 
Council Secretariat have framed civilian crisis-management, constitutes the central forum 
for coordination in the second pillar. With regard to cross-pillar issues, Coreper is also well 
positioned, “as [it] has the overview of what happens in the Community pillar, […] to keep 
an eye on whether decisions in the First Pillar are in line with those developed in CFSP and 
ESDP” (Vanhoonacker 2008:149). Council Committees dealing with crisis-management and 
reporting to the PSC include representatives of the member states, the Commission and 
the Council Secretariat. Potentially, they can serve as arenas of inter-pillar coordination. 
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) constitutes an exception, as it comprises Chiefs of 
Defence Staff of the member states or their deputies and advises the PSC on military crisis 
management (Duke 2008:89). The composition of the Committee on Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management (CivCom) is mixed – including representatives of member states and 
Commission. It reports to Coreper and advises the PSC on police and civilian options. A 
Civilian Planning Conduct Capabilities (CPCC) unit in the Council advises the PSC on 
operational planning of police and civilian missions (Duke 2008:91). The overall divide 
between military instruments of crisis-management (second pillar) and civilian crisis-
management (first and second pillar) has been addressed in the Civilian-Military Cell, 
established beneath the level of EUMC and CivCom. Again, its composition reflects the 
multiple institutions and policy issues involved, comprising “military” and “civilian 
planners” as well as “Council fonctionnaires” (Duke 2008:89). Amongst other functions, the 
Civilian-Military Cell has to oversee “the development of civilian-military relations within 
the institutions” (Duke 2008:89). Overall, the highly complex institutional structure clearly 
mirrors the attempt to achieve coherent inter-institutional decision-making.  
After the formal end to the inter-pillar structure, coordination is expected to improve with 
the establishment of the High Representative and the EEAS after the introduction of the 
Lisbon Treaty (Duke 2008: 99). The “new” High Representative and her administrative 
substructure, the EEAS, are meant to introduce further mechanisms of coordination with a 
potential for greater coherence (Raube 2007:289). It is yet to be seen if coherence will be 
achieved more easily thanks to the emerging hierarchical executive and administrative 
structures. The High Representative, as pointed out above, is Vice-President of the 
Commission and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Affairs and head of the EEAS, which, 
amongst others, consists of the CFSP/ESDP branches of the current Council Secretariat and 
the DG RELEX of the Commission.  
The emerging structure of the High Representative and the EEAS can already point to 
some potentials for further institutionalised coordination in the field.  The only DG within 
the EEAS directly supervised by the High Representative is the “ESDP and crisis-
management structures” unit (Council 2010). This entity within the EEAS includes the 
Military Staff (EUMS), the newly created Crisis Management and Planning Department 
(CMPD) and the CPCC. The strategic nucleus of the DG will be the CMPD, headed by 
Belgian diplomat Walter Stevens, and there will be a direct link to the Council’s CivCom, 
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which will be chaired by an EEAS member, M. Leinonen. Thus, crisis management 
structures have the potential to streamline strategic incentives and identify capabilities 
across the different areas of competence between CFSP and the Community. Potentially 
coherent action can be taken in the Council through the chairman role of the EEAS in 
CivCom. However, the coherence of crisis-management with other policies remains to be 
seen, as the High Representative will not take over all responsibilities in the areas of 
development and neighbourhood policy (Council 2010). 
Problems of horizontal coherence have also been identified in EU civilian crisis-
management missions on the ground (Gross 2011: 129; Keukeleire, Kalaja and Collaku 
2011: 202). The multiple competences in EU crisis-management are mirrored in the EU’s 
external representation and multiple EU actors (Commission delegations, EU Mission 
offices, Special Representatives, etc.) need to increase their coordination on the ground if 
they are to speak with one voice. As it has been pointed in the case of the 
EUPOL/Afghanistan, often it seems that multiple policy efforts exist in parallel instead of 
one coordinated action (Gross 2011). The changes in the Lisbon Treaty may again carry 
some potential to coordinate civilian-crisis-missions under the roof of the Union 
delegations. In the case of the EUPOL mission in Congo the Union delegation carry the 
overall coordinating function on the ground (Justaert 2011: 6). However, the sufficient 
coordination needs to be established from case to case between the national delegations, 
the Special Representatives and Heads of Delegations.   
The new system after Lisbon may be beneficial to horizontal coherence. The High 
Representative, the EEAS and its EU delegations, rather than overcoming conflicts of 
competence in civilian crisis-management, will further institutionalise the coordination of 
formerly separated institutions. 
Vertical coherence  
The European Commission communication “Europe in the World – Some Practical 
Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility” underlines that the EU has to 
ensure vertical coherence (2006). According to the logic of the Commission, the functional 
unity of the EU is only given if cross-pillar policies are coherently coordinated on the EU 
level, if the EU member states back these policies on the EU level, and if the European and 
the national level are bound together by sufficient coordination mechanisms. At the same 
time, member states have an obligation to cooperate and formulate their foreign policies 
in the context of the CFSP, including civilian crisis-management. Indeed, once member 
states stay away from coordination on the EU level, they do follow the obligation to 
actively formulate and support a common EU foreign policy, which is neither to be 
contradicted, nor to be weakened by the national level (Hillion and Wessel 2008: 91-92).  
Still, non-bridgeable differences between member states and the EU can run into a 
situation of vertical incoherence in civilian crisis-management as well. This is illustrated in 
the case of the civilian crisis-management mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Whereas the EU was 
not able to overcome member state differences on the recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence in 2008, the EU still decided to run EULEX. While the CSDP-based civilian 
crisis-management mission was an attempt to oversee the post-conflict crisis-
management in Kosovo, the EU was not able to fully back its EULEX mission with a clear 
view on the EU’s position towards the status of Kosovo (see also Keukeleire, Kalaja and 
Cullaku 2011). Similarly, the EU was able to run a monitoring mission in Georgia as a 
consequence of the Georgian-Russian conflict, but the member states remain divided over 
their grand policy towards Russia in the long-run (Bosse 2011: 143). One can argue that the 
overall incentive to provide coherent conflict-management tools to Kosovo and Georgia is 
undermined by the member states’ difference on the future status of Kosovo and the EU’s 
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relationship with Russia. At the same time, the member states’ resource commitments and 
bilateral actions need to be in line with EU action, if they are not to cause incoherent 
action. One fundamental problem of the Afghanistan mission EUPOL is said to be the 
lacking personnel that member states are able to provide to run the mission more 
effectively (Gross 2011: 128). In addition, bilateral action of member states on the ground 
often irritates coordinated action. 
Rifts across member states’ perceptions, actions and commitments mirror the diversity of 
member states in the EU. But the EU can try to increase coordinating efforts. While the HR 
and the President of the European Council are in a good position to coordinate actions 
between the member states after Lisbon (for example by chairing the Foreign Affairs 
Council), a vertically coherent civilian crisis-management will only get up and running if 
the member states are convinced by the potential of EU action. The new horizontal 
coordination setting in crisis-management involves member states at an early planning 
stage and it might persuade them to refrain from counter-productive action. As such, 
coordination towards horizontal and vertical coherence becomes intertwined. At the same 
time, it is interrelated with centres of global security governance. Following its Security 
Strategy, the EU supports and closely cooperated with the United Nations (UN), including 
in emerging conflicts and crisis-management (European Council 2003). The wording of 
several decisions on CSDP missions underline that EU crisis-management policies are “in 
close cooperation”, in “full complementarity” or “a follow-up” to the UN actions. Scholars 
highlight the coordination efforts between the EU and the UN (Wolter 2007), not without 
also emphasizing competitiveness on the ground (Gourlay 2010).   
Assessment: which polity type?  
The findings point to mechanisms and institutions that are in place in order to 
compensate for, or palliate, the absence of a clear hierarchical structure in civil crisis-
management. Current arrangements to ensure coherence do not correspond to the ideal 
state-like polity characterised by hierarchical organisation. Neither does the EU’s attempt 
to achieve coherence resemble an international organisation which mainly uses 
instruments of coordination to ensure member state solidarity and compliance. In the old 
and the new setting after Lisbon, procedures to ensure coherence go beyond classical 
intergovernmental coordination, while in civilian crisis-management intergovernmental 
and non-intergovernmental policies co-exist. In order to palliate the absence of a clear 
hierarchical structure in civilian crisis management, a close web of institutions has been 
put in place to ensure political coordination across pillars, with the Council’ s CivCom 
playing a central role. The Lisbon Treaty can be seen as another step towards more 
institutionalised coordination in civilian crisis-management. While the HR receives 
hierarchical powers within the EEAS that enable her to foster coordination, overall 
coordination is still necessary in the Council. While the system lacks overall hierarchy, we 
do identify institutionalized coordination, which – with a view on security governance –
can carry cosmopolitan imprints.  
Conclusion 
The present article identified the mechanisms devised by the EU to prevent incoherence 
both through institutional grand-reform and in inter-pillar policy fields. It has done so with 
the objective of ascertaining to which polity types the methods selected by the EU to 
enhance coherence correspond: either to a federated state, an intergovernmental 
organization or a cosmopolitan entity. The picture that emerges is heterogeneous. The 
macro-level of grand-institutional reform, typically agreed in the framework of Inter-
governmental Conferences (ICGs), presents an evolution. While in the initial treaty reforms 
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– Maastricht and Amsterdam – the methods used for co-ordination can be clearly 
associated with those of an intergovernmental organisation, the latest reforms display an 
increasingly institutionalized trend, even state-like features. The creation of a HR and the 
EEAS, whose functions clearly approximate those of a foreign minister and a ministry of 
foreign affairs illustrate this trend.      
In specific policies which necessitate inter-pillar collaboration, such as sanctions and 
civilian crisis-management, current mechanisms through which the EU ensures coherence 
go beyond intergovernmental coordination. Thus, here the EU cannot be equated to an 
international organisation. Sanctions decision-making features mechanisms that have 
become detached from the international organisation and now follow the hierarchical 
structure characteristic of a state: clear delimitation of competences and allocation of tasks 
along a hierarchical structure that allows for exceptionally smooth inter-pillar co-
ordination. In the case of civilian crisis-management coherence was increasingly pursued 
through the establishment of new council bodies and institutionalised co-ordination 
which transcends intergovernmental coordination but does not borrow tools 
characteristic of a state. Because EU civilian crisis-management is often conducted in 
global security governance framework combining various international bodies, which 
endows it with a marked cosmopolitan imprint, methods to ensure coherence in the EU 
resemble predominantly those of a cosmopolitan regional organisation.  
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